Nation on test : Identity and belonging after the EU referendum

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October 2018

Part of the British Academy's programme on Cohesive Societies

1.0   Introduction

While the European Union (EU) referendum campaign exposed deep public concern about national identity and the experience of belonging within the UK, it did so in starkly polarised terms, releasing a host of anxieties, prejudices and illusions which have continued to circulate through the subsequent months of argument and negotiation. Many urgent decisions have to be made in the wake of the referendum. These include how much immigration is to be welcomed, who should receive access to welfare and to citizenship, which trade deals are to be struck and with whom, what is the best possible arrangement on customs with the EU, how to retain strong defence arrangements across Europe, and how to maintain scientific cooperation. Even during the anticipated transition period it remains highly uncertain what material resources and opportunities may be maintained, altered, gained or lost for the UK. Equally important, however, is that what is said and done during this period must be accompanied by a concerted attempt to foster a tolerant understanding of identity. This will need to be both coherent and inclusive, within and between the nations, regions and communities of the UK. This article points to social and cultural fault lines that have become increasingly salient across the UK since the referendum. We then ask how the UK might achieve a new and far more generous idea of the country we are and wish to become.

We need to come to terms with the variety of British identities that exist today. We must also consider how these often contested notions of belonging might be framed by a more accommodating set of national narratives that could galvanise a more pluralistic Britain. Finding the optimal forms and functions of such narratives is therefore an urgent task. They matter individually as well as collectively, for our friends and families, for our workplaces, institutions, communities and governments.

In the UK, as elsewhere, we have seen unitary ideas of national identity raised, sometimes violently, in response to all manner of destabilisations - cultural, political and economic – to settled ways of life. All too frequently, this is occurring against the grain of decades of ethnic and cultural mixing that leans towards an idea of identities and communities as mixed and plural. Refugees and migrants whose movements are motivated by these currents may be more visible as they turn up at the borders of western countries, but they are by no means the only heralds of change. Even among apparently rooted and stable communities, conditions are evolving and life is becoming more plural. In our cities, it only takes a bus ride, a visit to a hospital clinic, or listening to contemporary music to realise how thoroughly mixed our everyday experience has become. And while in the suburbs and rural areas the mixing might be thinner or more recent, it is still the case that through travel, consumption and virtual engagement, local identities are in a very real sense the sum of participating in multiple communities of interaction. Yet, debates about Brexit continue to be dominated by simplified ideas of national identity that barely recognise this variegated reality. Some hark back to imagined, and incorrectly purified notions of British identity in the past, others propose a future that creates an entirely new, but as yet undefined, notion of national identity that is completely disconnected from either past or present conceptions.

In our view, the national discontent exposed and amplified by the referendum will not be settled, and may even be aggravated, by separation from the European Union. Some of the underlying anxieties about British identity stem from wider considerations related to British 'sovereignty', the country's changing place in the world. Other anxieties surround devolution and its consequences for the British state and the regional consequences of a centripetal model of economic development, as well as England's place in the United Kingdom. There are serious concerns about the growing chasm between 'the people' and the 'elites' and the well-to-do, exacerbated by widening economic inequality and growing social exclusion.[1] Further major challenges include incorporating new pressures on immigration, economic and technological change, the changing welfare state, and the multicultural diversity of society. Brexit has thrown into sharp relief both the ongoing crisis of post-war social

democracy[2] and the persistence of divisions that reach far back into British history. These divisions of class, gender, ethnicity and region have not been dissolved as many advocates of modernization once imagined they would. The Brexit process has also revealed a more personal sense of disruption affecting many people's sense of identity: a perceived corrosion of the traditional moorings of selfhood and character, changes in the relation with others and community; and an increasingly stark division between the comforts that may be shared with your own people and common past and discomfort about the presence of others and the prospect of a discontinuous future.

How we hold together as a nation will now rest on how successfully we address these sources of disquiet. They feed resentments that were escalated, if not created by Brexit, and which are likely to find further targets in time to come. Whether resentments are directed at migrants, bureaucrats ('European' and otherwise), Muslims, social workers or judges, depends at least partly on the whims of populist demagoguery.

Reflecting some of the themes and ideas emerging from the British Academy's work on Cohesive Societies, this article starts by identifying some of the frames of disquiet that have been maturing over the last half century: the 'left behind'; nostalgia and history; population anxiety; the broken link between citizen, state and individual; England and the UK. It then outlines some avenues by which to build a new national consensus that is more at ease with internal diversity but also with belonging to the rest of the world, including Europe.

2.0   Frames of Disquiet

2.1   The 'left behind'.

Historically, liberal governments have long understood that they have obligations to communities or individuals that have been challenged or displaced by new economic and historical developments. Such thinking has motivated attempts to lift the fallen out of want and wantonness, to relieve distressed areas or sectors of the economy, and to perhaps reduce the gap between distant others and the rapidly developing western centres. This tradition has continued to imply certain moral obligations even under the prevailing ethos that sees self-help as the way forward for all in market-made society. The idea of the 'left behind', which was relaunched in a study of UKIP[3] in 2014, has gone into an astonishing, global circulation, coming to refer not merely to the familiar recipients of western charity but to the neglected indigenous working class. Since serving as a policy motif during the Brexit referendum,[4] the idea of the 'left-behind' has migrated between Britain and America, where it served the Trump election campaign,[5] and versions have also gained traction elsewhere in Europe, as resentment against migration is declared as the cause of a neglected indigenous population.[6] However, it seems unlikely that mobilisation of 'the left behind' can wholly explain the result of the Brexit referendum, as evidence emerges of support for Brexit from a wider social spectrum including the middle aged, an anxious middle class, and some settled minorities.[7]

Yet if detailed analysis of the vote confounds simplistic versions of the 'left behind', the power of the rhetoric that framed the political debate using the concept of an abandoned and polemically whitened working class should not be underestimated. Around the world, this framing has become the well-spring of a politics of nationalist restitution – protectionist, redistributive, autochthonous – supposedly wrested out of the hands of (neo)liberal cosmopolitans held to have betrayed the nation. While it may well reflect true economic and cultural difficulties, in some versions, the language of the left behind makes a virtue of ignorance and complacency, and exploiting prejudice, bigotry and confusion. This is a highly relevant political cause, which needs to be disaggregated from purely symptomatic populist expressions, often justified on the nihilistic grounds that 'they've done nothing

for us yet.' Significantly, and after months when the idea of the 'left-behind' seemed to be on every pundit's tongue, it made its own journey from abundance to scarcity as soon as the referendum was done – a striking adjustment, which may suggest that those who were happy to use the phrase as they appealed to popular grievances during the referendum campaign, have proved much less willing to accept responsibility for the future of this patronised 'left behind' constituency since the referendum was won.

2.2   Nostalgia for historical glory.

In many expressions, the emerging politics of Brexit has been accompanied by longing for an earlier time of national vindication and pride. Brexit has given sharp definition to a hitherto vague sense that the long post-war epoch inaugurated by decolonialisation, the welfare state, European Community membership, and globalism in general has weakened the nation and betrayed its historic mission. We have been invited to believe that the interruption of history represented by Brexit finally opens the way for a future that is both healthily independent and restorative of a great national and imperial past. Some Brexit campaigners have reached all the way back in their revivalist appeals to the Magna Carta. Among older people particularly, however, the referendum reflected concern about Britain's more recent post-war history, engaging various notions about our alleged loss of national character since 1945. This attachment to a heroic view of the national past, has often coexisted with hostility towards anyone who, like the authors of the Parekh Report on *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (2000), presumed to suggest that, while the British nations may well have 'much to be proud of in their island story,'[8] the time had surely come to 'rethink' our idea of national identity in order to accommodate the diversity of the present population and the fact that Britain 'never has been the unified, conflict-free land of popular imagination.'[9] During the Brexit campaign, it was a controversially funded group named 'Veterans for Britain' that set out to redeclare the memory of the Second World War against a present allegedly ruled by 'faceless Brussels bureaucrats.'

Appeals such as these simplify both the views of the dead (some of whom lived long enough to cite the Second World War as a good reason to support British membership of the EEC in the early 1970s) and the realities of the remembered victory. They also tend to diminish or entirely overlook the involvement of the peoples of the British empire in both the twentieth century's world wars – clearly understood at the time by British writers including George Orwell, and by colonial subjects themselves. This selective and even colour-coded remembering of the war effort draws emotional force from blockbuster films such as *Dunkirk* and *The Darkest Hour,* and perhaps also from Dame Vera Lynn's return to the music charts. Fear of the possible consequences of Brexit is suspended, the case that might be made for remaining in Europe gets cast as a gutless and unpatriotic betrayal, and the spirit of both the Blitz and Dunkirk are taken to imply that even a no-deal Brexit would be fine for the nation that once flew Spitfires and brought its defeated soldiers back across the channel in little ships.

2.3   Population anxiety.

Xenophobia has been a persistent attendant of Brexit, its discourse often depicting East Europeans, refugees, and economic migrants from faraway as unassimilable bearers of incompatible languages, faiths and values. The adoption of this kind of framing appears to have been especially prominent in the rural heartlands and in economically sluggish areas,[10] many of which have had little direct experience of immigration before EU migration. The EU Referendum seemed to open the floodgate for unashamed racist labelling of migrants, settled or incoming, and of the nation as a white (English) heritage first and foremost.[11] 'Multiculturalism' remains under constant attack across the political spectrum and in the media at large, despite the fact that everyday civilities of coexistence amongst strangers may actually have increased, and become both more tolerant and sophisticated, especially in our cities where the negotiation of difference has become a fact of life.[12]

Wider concerns about 'freedom of movement' are also connected to the nation's perceived carrying capacity: whether there is enough to go around for everyone amidst austerity; whether the landscapes, settlements and infrastructures of this small island have reached breaking point; whether the scale and speed of migration is cheating the poor and turning 'home' into an unrecognisable place. Such considerations are easily swept up into nationalist narratives that over-ride complicating realities such as the fact that national population growth is shared between migration flows and people in the UK living longer, that in many fields the country vitally depends on 'migrant' labour,[13] that sharp controls on immigration already exist,[14] that overcrowding is concentrated (socially as well as spatially) in a comparatively small number of areas of the United Kingdom,[15] and that 'home' may actually always have been an evolving experience in which the familiar and unfamiliar (and not just the imagined) are combined. Kept firmly in view, these complicating considerations would encourage a less toxic debate on the nation's carrying capacity, and a more humane set of policies on immigration.

2.4 The broken link: citizen, state and individual.

The state has proven to be one of the key sources of vexation in recent arguments about identity. Many key national institutions, including the NHS and our universities, have come under attack as being the prisoners of a kind of 'political correctness' – bureaucratising the will for social change and reducing social values to a managerial code. And this, despite the record of modernisation, efficiency and openness. This framing is part of a broader tendency to see the welfare state and many of its institutions – and representative politics in general – as self-serving and distant from the citizen, no longer carrying the general will, no longer mediating the social contract, no longer delivering collective wellbeing. For a nation that has styled itself since the last World War as a liberal democracy placing its trust in representative institutions in the way of the middle European or Scandinavian countries, this is a significant development, and possibly also a point of no return, as the public mood swings behind the spirit of rugged individualism, consumer sovereignty, and minimal state involvement seeded by Thatcherite conservatism. Much bolstered by populist fervour and strongman posturing, a new political culture has come to the fore, one that cuts across old political divides and seems fundamentally ill at ease with the legacy of negotiation between citizen, state and parliament. In the Brexit context, the model Brit seems less a convivial and respectful citizen than a ruggedly independent individual: fitfully patriotic, flagrantly opinionated, and fiercely into 'outlaw' attitudes of the sort that various social investigators have seen emerging alongside 'post-industrialism' since the 1970s.[16] This resurgent individual is intolerant of the establishment, elites and delegated authority, and espouses a different kind of collective enterprise: oppositional and clamorous, pulsating and disruptive, tribal-national.

2.5 England and the UK.

The vote for Brexit has coincided with an intensified search for an emphatically English identity, variegated and regionally different, but also balancing centralisation and devolution in Britain and England. This is 'England' imagined as the land of an overlooked and imperfectly represented majority that refuses any longer to remain silent – the country of G.K. Chesterton's much quoted 'secret people' who 'never have spoken yet.'[17] It is hard to gauge the strength of this feeling and to establish from whom exactly it stems. Writing over a century ago, G.K. Chesterton lamented that the English had never risen up to create a thoroughgoing revolution for themselves, but the 'secret people' of his still much quoted poem now seem to express the yearnings of the 'left behind,' of the shires and old industrial heartlands, of the nostalgic, of the pre-cosmopolitan. In ambition too, the quest for an English identity remains oddly inchoate – a fact that allows its advocates and demagogues to light many fuses with it. In some versions it appears as a plea for greater and more active political representation, along the lines of the devolved region (despite what some see as England's dominance of British political economy). Sometimes, as members of immigrant communities know well, 'England' is a code for a White Christian nation, the Olde England of rooted communities, warm beer and

haystacks, gradual change and familiar people. In other versions, it represents an attempt to set out the defining civic or political virtues – fairness, tolerance, self-deprecation, determination – believed to make England distinct from the larger Britishness imposed from Westminster, or from the 'Napoleonic' traditions of Europe.

As in the past, this quest for England within and sometimes against the British state, is not reserved for a single political tradition. History holds many examples of 'England' being rallied against perceived evils by liberal and leftist interests – ranging from the 'Little Englanders' who supported Irish Home Rule and opposed the British state's pursuit of imperial adventures in the late 19th century to more recent examples of the kind that Billy Bragg has described as 'progressive patriotism.'[18] In England, as in Scotland during the debates surrounding the devolution referendum of 1997, there is a strong case for differentiating between 'civic' articulations of nationalism, concerned with developing effective forms of political and institutional representation, and more 'cultural' forms, which can indeed be recidivist, xenophobic and exclusive.

3.0   Common Ground

As the preceding discussion indicates, the challenge of assembling a country at ease with itself involves a lot more than fixing the terms on which the UK leaves the EU. There is a deeper sense of malaise that needs to be addressed, so as to configure compositions of national identity and belonging capable of deflecting tribal stand-offs. Building this configuration will take time and effort, and it will require a richer, more informed and less strident tone of debate than that during the referendum, where both sides accused each other of falsehood, treachery and doom. The polarised language has persisted, at the expense of serious discussion of how we might foster a sense of shared identity and wellbeing amidst the givens of constant cultural change and diversity in the country. It is surely time to reconsider the habit of understanding belonging through defensively homogenised ideas of national identity. It is necessary to explore other ways of creating community in which widely experienced differences can be accommodated. While the London Olympics of 2012 showed what was possible here, the separatist nationalism fostered by the leave campaign around the referendum four years later seemed in many ways a rejection of that promise, and a return to an older and far less open or dynamic idea of British identity. What, then, is the terrain on which we might develop a more expansive experience of identity in the UK? In what follows, we propose five anchor points, sketched not with any sense of prescription, but instead as matters central to reframing the national conversation. These anchor points are: a renewing of the social contract; democratic institutionalism; a civic nation; culture as everyday practice; and opening the archive for a new future. This sketch is offered in the knowledge that the issue will require further explanation, debate and undoubtedly some contestation.

3.1   The Social Contract Renewed.

There is surely a connection between the cultural malaises of Brexit and the distributional failures of the current economic system. A decade of austerity has reforms have exacerbated social and regional inequality, through unevenly distributed welfare reforms, investment restraints and economic kerbs.[19] With the universalist ambitions and public institutions of the post-war welfare state under fire, the UK has developed the markings of an ailing and divided society, its wants and needs only selectively protected, ripe material for a politics of resentment and blame. The contests around the NHS during the referendum campaign are illustrative, mixing national love for the institution, frustration at its shortfalls, antipathy towards usurpers including immigrants (who ironically contribute in many ways to its success), and fear for its survival because of funding restrictions and constraints. Without denying the challenge of new demographic, economic and technological changes, it seems clear to us

that the discontentment engaged by the Brexit referendum will persist without renewal of the idea and practice of public provisioning, symbolised by the NHS at its best.

A revived public discourse of unambiguous political commitment to the principle of universal welfare (and we recognise the political challenges implied by this - e.g. accusations of throwback or throwaway thinking), would help to temper anxiety about the uncertain future, animosity towards those judged to be taking scarce resource away, and suspicion of the state. The case needs to be made by public commentators and political parties and movements with commitment, creativity and conviction, not by stealth or coyly for fear of offending an established neoliberal logic of minimal, selective and parsimonious public provisioning. It should include defending the historic institutions of the welfare state and social democracy in general – from elected bodies to negotiated rules and accountable forms of expertise – through forceful acknowledgement that, at their best, these institutions have served the general interest and worked as a legitimate expression of public authority. Brexit may be dead set against all versions of the bureaucratic logic that James C. Scott has called 'seeing like a state,'[20] yet it is the regulations, courts, schools, hospitals, local authorities that are the central institutions of social maintenance, repair and care. This is the time to defend the moral economy of the shared commons, the social contract between state and citizen, and to abate the corrosive distinctions being made between deserving and undeserving subjects.

3.2 Democratic Institutionalism.

A mounting public unease with the politics of representation has been evident both during and since the referendum campaigns. This surge of mistrust of national parties, experts, elites and bureaucracies, and a greater desire for devolved or direct powers, poses a fundamentally important institutional question.[21] Is the future to be made through representative institutions reformed in ways that restore their efficacy and public trust in them – for example through their greater transparency, accountability and inclusivity - or does it belong to various forms of tribal and populist politics? Born out of frustration with the political norm, and amplified by affective connections sustained through social media, the latter forms appear to have risen in appeal and impact. Preventing civil dialogue over vexed issues of belonging in a diverse polity, they tread the thin line between genuine public mobilisation, mob rule, and capture by organised forces, promising a political society that is at once empowered, fragmented, fickle and strong-armed. We could end up as a society of pitted animosities or authoritarian rule, without much care for pursuing the general interest, reconciling differences, making room for the many, or seeing issues as they may be outside polarising conspiracy theories.

Faced with these challenges, representative democracy needs to be renewed, not sacrificed, its institutions opened up, revitalised, and reconnected. The changes that will come with Brexit provide an opportunity for the UK to reflect openly and widely on the role of Parliament, the quality and depth of our democracy and the prominence of London and the South-east. It also provides us an opportunity to consider how to deepen democratic belonging across all the nations and regions of the UK, as well as recognise and strengthen the values and institutions, such as the NHS and our universities, that can help to foster a broader, more inclusive sense of belonging.

3.3 Civic Nation.

The toxicity towards migrants that Brexit has unleashed remains all too real and won't be addressed by the serendipities of encounter with the unfamiliar.[22] The times require an explicit and more positively presented understanding that multi-ethnicity and multiculture are established facts of British life.[23] Although Britain is as constitutionally plural in composition as it is part of a global system of flow, connectivity and exchange, the myth of the UK as a closed White Nation is being mobilised against those deemed to be out of place. Under these circumstances, it is tempting to suggest that we turn the clock back a couple of decades by rekindling the language of multiculturalism, but the situation

requires more than the defence of migrant enclaves (though this was hardly the goal of 1980s multiculturalism even when it insisted on equality of provision from within the state). Meanwhile any attempt to mobilise around a unifying myth of Englishness or Britishness has been thwarted by the developments alluded to earlier.

Perhaps a more promising cue is to be found in the ways in which people from different backgrounds already rub along together in the public spaces of our cities,[24] suggesting a language of shared belonging that does not demand wholly shared identity or cultural compliance. In our cities, the culture of rubbing along in our differences has two important characteristics. One is an already quite widely shared civility of indifference to difference, born out of the necessities of having to negotiate so much strangeness. The second is a general acceptance that the city's public resources are indeed shared spaces.[25] Perhaps we should think of the nation on similar lines, with belonging understood as part of a variegated communal whole: a matter of civility between strangers, underpinned by shared amenities and resources that can be used in different ways and which no one in particular owns on their terms alone. Here the emphasis falls on co-existence and shared turf, expecting from all – not just newcomers – a civility of indifference to difference and need for common resources. Further effort along these lines might take the cultural life of the country, which has actually been premised on multiple identities and prosaic interactions for decades, to the next step, more actively engaging the benefits of the availability of different cultures and perspectives through the arts, design, literature, cuisine and popular entertainment.

An understanding and policy developed along these lines might encourage actual forms of 'peaceful coexistence' in which difference, distinctiveness, even strangeness are not constructed as 'otherness'. This would help to create a public language of belonging that celebrates and fosters today's multiple British identities and affiliations. Within such a framework of belonging, worries about migration from Europe or elsewhere would be less easily escalated into vituperative ethnic nationalism.

3.4   Culture as Everyday Practice.

The weakened, demoralized and, in some cases, overwhelmed condition of our public institutions[26] reinforces suspicion and a sense of separation between mobile and settled communities, and encourages easy labelling of the kind we have seen describing the working class as resentful and 'left behind' and European migrants as predatory or alien. Such caricatures have an uncanny capacity to stick, and they obscure the resourceful and charismatic practices that already exist within and between communities.

Thus, for example, the 'left behind' caricature of the British working class is proving far from helpful, buttressed by reports of findings from surveys that concentrate on attitudes held by some working class Leave supporters. These opinions may well exist, but so too does a long history of self-betterment through education, work, association and sociability. The experience of those whom some Brexiteers routinely invoked as 'the white working class' is actually full of accommodations with the strange and unknown – situated everyday familiarities which may be experienced in the neighbourhood, workplace, or school. Consider the huge extent of cultural interpenetration in many spheres of life – cuisine and restaurants, film and television, work, travel and public encounter – which together indicate an experiential cosmopolitanism that now touches nearly all classes and social groups. A richer anthropology of working class life might reveal that the popular defence, revealed and perhaps also exploited by Brexit, of the familiar and local is not actually intrinsically anti-European or xenophobic, but a reaction against a scale and speed of change, and also a sense of political and economic abandonment for which successive national governments are largely responsible.

3.5   Opening the Archive for a New Future.

Remembrance, both formal as well as informal, has been quite fundamental to the kinds of language and narratives used by the Leave campaign and UKIP, with its tendency to look back towards a fondly imagined but now disrupted age of imperial pride, martial courage, and shared roots. This idea of the national past seemed quite untouched by the many efforts being made to produce a wider and more inclusive understanding of Britain's history as one – even in its most glorious moments - of cosmopolitan encounter and collaboration in which many races and ethnicities have long found their place. For some the British Empire may always feature too lightly on the school history curriculum, but we are seeing many open and enquiring histories of Britain in books, film and television, and also in museums (e.g., in the ongoing commemoration of the First World War). Schools have been keen participants in this re-grounding of historical understanding, despite the imposition of a narrowed national curriculum in which history is expected to bolster a present idea of identity.[27] If this is partly a matter of overcoming simplistic historical mythologies that turn the past into a lost world to which we must return, it also involves approaching history as a resource for understanding the potentialities of the future.

There are many examples of causes and dispositions that have set out to break the mould in order make a better future, but which have, nevertheless, been careful to draw on history and memory in order to build new inclusions, new images of progress for the benefit of the many. The history of the women's movement, social democracy, unionism, civil rights provide rich evidence of a critically informed use of memory, recovered in the service of an improved future. The simplified, schematic and ideologically aligned nature of Brexit's version of national history should also remind us that 'cultural deprivation,' far from just being a difficulty faced by hard-pressed incoming communities, can also shape the mentality of the rooted who may have to live and make sense of the developments affecting their world from within restricted frames or reference. Opening up the archive for a more progressive sense of place and purpose may also provoke new thinking about the resources the new generations will need to muster if they are to achieve the same kind of comforts and reassurances from which the post-war generation benefitted.

We have described some of the deeper challenges that the UK faces regardless of the terms of our future involvement in Europe. There is a lot of national rebuilding to be done, but the situation also demands that we learn how to face the future through and with, rather than against, diversity. In this preliminary outline we have tried to describe the frames of disquiet that strike us pressing, and to indicate some aspects of the way forward.

The British Academy is currently exploring the theme of Cohesive Societies through a cross-cutting programme exploring how societies can remain cohesive in the face of rapid political, social, economic and technological change. The programme is shaped around five themes: cultural memory and tradition, social economy, meaning and mechanisms of social responsibility, identity and belonging, and care for the future.

The possible areas of common group described in this article relate to these five themes: both 'the social contract renewed' and 'democratic institutionalism' relate closely to the Cohesive Societies theme 'meaning and mechanisms of social responsibility'; 'civic nation' relates closely to the Cohesive Societies theme 'social economy'; and both 'culture as everyday practice' and 'opening the archive for a new future' relate closely to the Cohesive Societies themes 'cultural memory and tradition' and 'care for the future'.

The British Academy is also undertaking a programme of work on the theme of Governing England, which relates the frame of disquiet 'England and the UK'. This programme will culminate in the publication of Governing England: English Identity and Institutions in a Changing UK in autumn 2018.

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[2] Marcel Pauly (2018) 'European Social Democracy Extinct?' Social Europe. https://www.socialeurope.eu/pauly; Jon Henley (2017) '2017 and the curious demise of Europe's centre-left'. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2017/dec/29/2017-and-the-curious-demise-of-europes-centre-left

[3] Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin (2014) *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain,* London: Routledge.

[4] Sara B. Hobolt (2016) 'The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent', *Journal of European Public Policy,* 23:9, 1259-1277.

[5] Robert Wuthnow (2018) *The Left Behind: Decline and Rage in Rural America,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[6] Dominique S. Wirz et al. (2018) 'The Effect of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and Cognitions towards Immigrants', *The International Journal of Press/Politics,* 23(4), 496-516.

[7] For a preliminary survey of the vote see: Lord Ashcroft (24 June 2016) 'How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday . . . and Why' *Lord Ashcroft Polls.* https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/

[8] Runnymede Trust (2000) *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain,* London: Profile. p18.

[9] Ibid., p26.
See also Tariq Modood (2018) 'Multicultural Nationalism, *OpenDemocracy* 13 August 2018. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/tariq-modood/multicultural-nationalism

[10] Sara B. Hobolt (2016) 'The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent', *Journal of European Public Policy,* 23:9, 1259-1277.

[11] Tendayi Achiume (2018) *End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.* https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23073&LangID=E

[12] Anthony Heath (2017) 'Introduction', in: The British Academy (2017) *"If you could do one thing…" 10 local actions to promote social integration: Essay collection.* London: The British Academy. https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/British%20Academy%20IYCDOT%20Essays.pdf

[13] Migration Advisory Committee (2017) *EEA-workers in the UK labour market: A briefing note to accompany the call for evidence.* https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/636286/2017_08_08_MAC_Briefing_paper.pdf

[14] Michael Beine et al. (2018) 'Comparing Immigration Policies: An Overview from the IMPALA Database', *International Migration Review,* 50(4), 827-863.

[15] Danny Dorling in: Andy Beckett (2016) 'Is Britain full? Home truths about the population panic'. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/09/is-britain-full-home-truths-about-population-panic

[16] See, for example, Ray Pahl (1984) *Divisions of Labour,* Oxford: Blackwell.

[17] G.K. Chesterton, 'The Secret People' (1907), in Stephen Medcalf (ed.) (1994), *Poems for all Purposes: the selected poems of G.K. Chesterton,* London: Pimlico. pp56-8.

[18] Billy Bragg (2006) *The Progressive Patriot,* London: Bantam Press.

[19] Annette Hastings et al (2018) *The cost of the cuts: the impact on local government and poorer communities.* York: The Joseph Rowntree Foundation. https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/cost-cuts-impact-local-government-and-poorer-communities

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[26] Emily Andrews et al. (2017) *Performance Tracker: A data-driven analysis of the performance of government.* Institute for Government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/5991%20IFG%20-%20Performance%20tracker%20Autumn%202017%20update.pdf

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